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I come to praise boredom, not to bury it. And boredom, for its part, is far from defeated. 
Indeed, all the more that we take up arms against it, and seek to surround and overtake 
it, all the more does it stand before us, quiet, resolute, unmoved.
Much can be said against boredom. Boredom is a listless casting-about for purpose; 
the drifting existential anguish of one’s life experienced as meaningless, even if only 
temporarily so. It is the feeling that nothing is really worth it, where ‘it’ may be time or 
effort, and often a vanishingly small amount of either. But boredom is not depression: it 
does not claim that nothing is actually worth it, or that there is no purpose, only that, at 
this time, we don’t feel that purpose, and don’t care to get anything done.
Boredom has a perhaps unexpectedly specific political economic history. We see bore-
dom emerge in Europe alongside industrialization. To some extent, it seems, bourgeois 
life brings freedom from an experience of purpose along with a freedom from want. The 
availability of leisure time – at least, in the absence of integration in a communal, village 
life, with its traditions: dance, craft, song, storytelling, etc. – brings the challenge of 
finding purpose for the emerging middle class. The empty time which the aristocracy 
had long before learned to occupy with amusement was brought to the bourgeoisie as 
an element of luxury, but without the thoroughbreds, hunting lands, and private chefs 
which made that time luxurious. Free time then becomes a precious commodity, worth 
more than the paltry amusements available to fill it with – unless, of course, we adopt 
a hobby: an activity which we engage in as a ‘pass-time’/pastime without making any 
claim of its value (for example, we do not claim that everyone ought to be doing the 
same as we) or even claiming that others should understand why we find it to be a 
worthy investment of empty hours.1
Reflecting on this problem of leisure, we may look to this striking passage from Arthur 
Schopenhauer:
1.  As Theodor Adorno said, ‘I have no hobby. Not that I am the kind of workaholic, who is incapable 
of doing anything with his time but applying himself industriously to the required task. But, as far 
as my activities beyond the bounds of my recognized profession are concerned, I take them all, 
without exception, very seriously. So much so, that I should be horrified by the very idea that they 
had anything to do with hobbies – preoccupations with which I had become mindlessly infatuated 
merely in order to kill the time – had I not become hardened by experience to such examples 
of this now widespread, barbarous mentality. Making music, listening to music, reading with all 
my attention, these activities are part and parcel of my life; to call them hobbies would make a 
mockery of them’. (Theodor Adorno, ‘Free Time’, in J.M. Bernstein (ed.) The Culture Industry, New 
York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 188–9.)
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That human life must be some kind of mistake is sufficiently proved by the simple 
observation that man is a compound of needs which are hard to satisfy; that their 
satisfaction achieves nothing but a painless condition in which he is only given over 
to boredom; and that boredom is a direct proof that existence is in itself valueless, 
for boredom is nothing other than the sensation of the emptiness of existence. For 
if life, in the desire for which our essence and existence consists, possessed in itself 
a positive value and real content, then would be no such thing as boredom: mere 
existence would fulfill and satisfy us.2
Schopenhauer’s view of boredom is in need of deconstruction, in a Heideggerian 
sense. A short detour to Descartes will be necessary.
In Heidegger’s analysis of Descartes in Being and Time and ‘The Age of the World Pic-
ture’, among other places in his writing, Cartesian coordinates give to us a view of emp-
ty space as primary, with the lived experiences of place as a secondary cultural overlay.3 
The truth is the other way around: it is a cultural artifact, and a foundational moment in 
the age of the modern-scientific world picture, where we begin to say that what is meas-
urable is real, and that whatever makes the world most available to mathematics, exact 
science, and technological use is what is most real and most true of the world. Much as 
Bruno Latour found later in the Salk Institute,4 here too the result of a sociotechnical pro-
cess is projected backwards as its own origin: posterior to creating a system whereby 
all place can be standardized and made available to calculation, the pre-existence of an 
empty three-dimensional nothingness is metaphysically projected as having been there 
all along, discovered by rather than created by sociotechnical practices.
Similarly, Schopenhauer finds that leisure and freedom from toil and want give way to 
a discovery of an underlying boredom, which forms the empty space-time in which 
our lives occur. His view implies that boredom has always been the fundamental char-
acter of existence, and if it has not always seemed this way – and it hasn’t – then it is 
because we have been heretofore too busy and unhappy to notice the quieter back-
ground noise of our essential boredom, revealed in leisure and satisfaction like the 
60Hz hum of the lights as we sit in an office, staring blindly wondering what next to do.
As is often the case, Friedrich Nietzsche provides a useful correction and expansion to 
Schopenhauer’s misdirected brilliance. We turn to the famous §125 of The Gay Science:
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither 
is God?” he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his 
murderers […] What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? 
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not 
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still 
2.  Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The Vanity of Existence’, in Essays and Aphorisms, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, 
New York: Penguin, 2004, pp. 53–4.
3.  Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, New York: Harper, 1977; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
4.  Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
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any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not 
feel the breath of empty space?5
God is dead today because god is not God. The centrality of the Church in European 
society gave way to the marketplace, where this pseudo-Diogenes raises his voice 
and hoists his lantern. The purposelessness felt in boredom is not a truth underlying 
existence per se, but rather a product of this historical moment, as Lars Svendsen6 and 
Elizabeth Goodstein7 have also argued. It is not the vanity of existence that is revealed 
in boredom, but the vanity of modernity. It is in modernity’s quiet moments when we 
begin to smell the divine putrefaction, and, through this, the time when the madman 
can be heard begins to near.
It is to this that I will now turn: the sense in which boredom stands before us as a threat, 
a challenge, an opportunity. Let me sing now a panegyric to boredom, a hymn of praise 
to this experience of emptiness – for it is, as Heidegger has argued, a clearing.
Here, like Lars Svendsen in A Philosophy of Boredom, I follow Heidegger’s analysis of 
boredom in his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics8 only up to a certain point, but 
veer away from metaphysics into practical ethics. I’m not interested, at the moment at 
least, in boredom as a clearing that gives us an opening to the question of the mean-
ing of being, but rather as a clearing that gives us an opening to the question of our 
particular being – a clearing from which we can view Dasein rather than Sein. 
Boredom as a dissatisfaction with what lies before us is, as Walter Benjamin has 
claimed in Convolute D of his Arcades Project, ‘the threshold to great deeds’,9 which 
is fundamentally optimistic. It is a seeking out and a moving forward, compelled by the 
breath of empty space and the stench of the rotting god. Being bored by something 
motivates a break, a change, and as such a motivation, requires an opening up of pos-
sibilities. Boredom-by, in this way, is the clearing away, the emotional negation of the 
past and the established, which opens a space of innovation.
But we are not only bored-by; we are sometimes gripped by a more fundamental bore-
dom, an objectless boredom in which we are not only bored by what we are doing, but 
bored by the things we could be doing as well. This too is an opening and a clearing 
away, and provides a space for open reflection, not in how to reach a goal, but in our 
values themselves.
We shy away from this existential boredom, and fail to worry that we are losing some-
thing of value. With our children, as they become ever busier with school, music les-
sons, sports, and so forth, we worry that they are losing their interiority and self-direc-
5.  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1974, pp. 
181–2.
6.  Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, trans. John Irons, London: Reaktion, 2005.
7.  Elizabeth Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
8.  Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas 
Walker, Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press, 1995.
9.  Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 105.
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tion, since they are never confronted by free time. Similarly, we worry that with toys 
that dictate certain forms of play, and which come pre-packaged with their own nar-
ratives, our children are losing capacities for imagination, creativity, and story-telling, 
better supported by childhoods running through forests and parks, playing with sticks 
and cardboard boxes. Should we not worry that adults stand to suffer similar losses 
through the devaluation of, and attempt to, eliminate boredom?
I hasten to say, though, that tedium, circumstantially necessary and unavoidable bore-
dom, is not such an opening, and deserves no praise. Those who are bored by the neces-
sary steps of continuing forth, and have no other options – those working multiple jobs 
just to get by day-to-day, who are denied creative opportunities, and have few alternatives 
– to them boredom is a pain unredeemed in the absence of the opening of alternatives. 
Boredom that disguises itself from itself is also not deserving of praise. The ‘entertain-
ment’ taken in watching whatever happens to be on television, for example, is a form 
of boredom that calls itself pleasure, and in this deception allows empty experience to 
persist without being impelled toward questioning and reconsideration. Sometimes it 
is admittedly desirable to shut off the brain and stare blankly at something that does 
not occupy the mind, but this form of boredom that hides from itself does not present 
the virtues of boredom to us.
Being bored along with others, however, is a process of creating meaning when it does 
not collapse into boredom in disguise. Watching television with others, for example, may 
be as empty as watching alone. But it can also be an occasion for snide comments, heck-
ling, and conversation; far more creative and active forms of doing nothing in particular. 
Being actively bored along with others is, in fact, a primary source of meaning in our 
lives. We find it important to take time to sit around with friends, go to lunch, out for 
drinks, or just waste time together. This is not because there is anything terribly impor-
tant about the content of this time. It is not important because we speak of anything 
important; usually we do not. It is certainly not important because we are eating an 
important sandwich. It is meaningful because it is a space free of purpose, of needs, of 
ends, and therefore a space where collaborative creativity in creating meaning can be 
practiced. Whether anything of value comes out of that practice is not only beside the 
point, it is even against the point. 
These meaningful moments of boredom-alongside are meaningful because they are 
stretches of time devoid of meaning, in which means have no end and therefore can-
not be means, in which we are given free play in the creation of meaning and value 
on our own terms. Just as in Kant’s aesthetic theory from his Critique of Judgment,10 
disinterestedness is a precondition of the perception of beauty, which is our enjoyment 
of the free play of understanding and imagination. Similarly, boredom is a precondition 
(though not a necessary one) of ‘hanging out’ and ‘quality time’, which are constituted 
by our enjoyment of the collaborative free play of our ability to determine our own val-
ues and define meaningfulness in our lives. Boredom is our experience of the greatest 
10.  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.
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weight, to invoke Nietzsche once more: the burden of modernity in the experience of 
our lives as without purpose. But it is also the gateway to the greatest possibility of 
modernity (that we should create meaning along with others) and we find being bored 
along with others to be meaningful because it gives us the experience of doing so.
—
It has taken us quite some time to get to the second part of the topic of this text, and 
I’m sure I have tried your patience. (Perhaps you have become bored?) But here we 
reach it. Having outlined the value, meaning, and meaningfulness of boredom of cer-
tain kinds, I can finally make the claim that one of the great successes of Facebook is 
the way in which it allows us to be bored together.
To be sure, there are ways of being bored on Facebook that are not deserving of praise, 
just as there are unpraiseworthy forms of boredom in our lives offline. Just as we may flee 
from boredom into mindless entertainment through the empty gaze of watching whatever 
happens to be on television, so too may we mindlessly occupy our time in Farmville or 
other antisocial forms of ‘social games’.11 But Facebook games may also be engaged in 
as a social activity among friends. Like watching something along with friends may be 
made into a social activity through heckling and conversation, so too may the pastime of 
gaming – perhaps Words with Friends or Draw Something may be better examples here 
than Farmville – be made into a social experience and a convivial way of filling empty time.
A more insidious form of fleeing boredom into entertainment is the approach to the 
friend feed, which seeks distraction and approaches friends as mere content provid-
ers rather than friends. Here, our boredom is treated as an isolated fact: we say ‘I’m 
bored’, and approach the friend feed as a source of unengaged entertainment. We 
might call this ‘friendertainment’. 
By contrast, we look often enough at the feed not as a source of distraction and 
friendertainment, but as a great crowd of friends and family engaged in conversa-
tions which we are implicitly or explicitly invited to join. Here, the value of boredom 
emerges, and emerges in a way well supported by the communications structures and 
affordances of the Facebook platform.
The conglomeration of large portions of our offline and online social graphs in a single 
location ensures that, when we find ourselves bored, we can easily find others we care 
about who are also bored and seeking to start conversations, share experiences, and 
play. Aimless navigation to a single site opens up a wealth of opportunities for social-
ity, without having to determine in advance whether, for example, we might wish to be 
bored along with others by getting into an argument, sharing common views, hearing 
about their kids, or watching something together. The simple practice of, as we say in 
American English, ‘shooting the shit’, need not wait for a leisurely afternoon appoint-
ment for coffee or beers, but may be taken up at any given moment when we are wait-
ing for the beans to finish cooking, folding the laundry, standing on queue, or avoiding 
something tedious but ‘important’.
11.  See for example, Elizabeth Losh, ‘With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?’, in D.E. 
Wittkower (ed.) Facebook and Philosophy, Chicago: Open Court, 2010, pp. 33-48.
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Facebook also provides for collaboratively interpreted shared media experiences as a 
social practice of boredom and the play of meaning creation. When we share a music 
video, a cat video, a picture of a baby otter, or any other audiovisual content, we are 
making two implicit statements: first, that we have watched and enjoyed this, and sec-
ond, that we are inviting others to view and experience this as if alongside us. When 
we watch something that someone else has shared, we watch it with the imagined 
co-presence of our friend alongside us; we imagine her reactions, and look out for 
the content’s merits informed by our knowledge of her taste and sense of humor. As I 
have argued elsewhere,12 the result is best understood not as merely watching some 
content or other, but as an asynchronous shared experience at a distance, for the value 
we find in it inheres at least as closely to our friendship as it does with enjoyment of the 
content for its own sake, especially when the posting is accompanied by commentary 
and interpretation, and when we follow up on the threaded-commentary format of the 
posting by engaging in discussion and banter.
Although this is more commonly done on Twitter, Facebook is also used for ongoing 
synchronous commentary on shared experiences at a distance; for example, posting 
status updates about or live-tweeting a prominent political speech or popular televi-
sion program. In a recent example, many users produced a collaborative live com-
mentary and discussion for the Summer Olympics, resulting in a social backchannel 
to otherwise isolated media consumption, and producing numerous spoilers for those 
watching events with a time-delayed broadcast.
In many cases, though, the shared experience at a dis-
tance is online-native. Alongside discussion, debate, 
and advice-seeking, we engage in memetic play, shar-
ing lolcats, political images, humor, and simple silli-
ness. ‘Meaningless’ play in meaning-creation abounds 
on Facebook, and spins off into systems of communi-
cative elements which persist apart from any reference 
or importance outside of themselves. Ceiling cat and 
the Lolrus have their own narratives, open to and ro-
bust enough to support playful interaction within those 
narratives themselves, as in the crowd-authored Lolcat 
bible, as well as being ported out into commentary and 
interpretation of life outside of these memetic spaces. 
‘Condescending Wonka’ has taken on a distinctive role 
in political argumentation; ‘Y U NO Guy’ allows a play-
ful way of voicing frustration and criticism.
Facebook not only provides these various affordances for performing the active bore-
dom that gives us an experience of free-play in value creation, but also provides a 
touchstone which supports carrying over the practice of active boredom into our lives 
outside of Facebook. The online détournement of ‘websurfing’ is transformed from a 
reception of content to a series of potentially shared experiences. The ready sharability 
12.  D.E. Wittkower, ‘Friend is a Verb’, APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 12.1 (Fall 2012): 
n.p.





of new media, along with Facebook’s constant background presence (either figura-
tively or literally – in a background window), results in a social reading and viewing of 
material. As we wander around online, we find our friends’ interests engaged along 
with our own, and take note not only of those things which we find engaging, but also 
those things that others will value, care about, or be angered by. We need not regard 
this as a mere illusion of sociality, but an ideation of social experience that is often 
enough realized through subsequent sharing and asynchronous shared experiences. 
In our offline lives as well, living with Facebook in the background produces an active 
boredom wherein we narrate our experiences to ourselves, and see them as already 
occurring in the context of a future retroactive sociality and shared process of interpre-
tation and reflection. The future gaze of the absent friend transforms our current empty 
time into a prospective experience of boredom-alongside, allowing us to find our cur-
rent boredom not as empty time under the tedious meaningless of which we suffer, but 
as time wasted along with others: leisure well but purposelessly spent.
We can see a kind of performative confirmation of 
these claims in the much-derided practice of photo-
graphing pictures of your lunch. As discussed before, it 
is a natural thing to ask your friend what they’re getting 
as you sit together looking through a menu, and to ask 
how her lunch is as you eat. Yet this does not have to 
do with any inherent value in this particular sandwich, 
nor is it (for the most part) self-interested angling for an 
offer to taste it. We ask because we care for our friend, 
and desire an experience of closeness; her experience 
of the dish is of interest because we desire to share 
lunch, and information of the inner experiences of our 
friend is a part of the shared event.
The impulse to take a picture of your lunch and post it to Facebook or Twitter only 
makes sense when we view this as an invitation to participate in a shared asynchro-
nous experience at a distance. The picture of the sandwich is not self-important or 
narcissistic. The picture of the sandwich is an invitation to have lunch together.
These ways in which Facebook supports a kind of active boredom-alongside play a 
significant and unobvious role in Facebook’s success. This role is unobvious, for the 
most part, because boredom is undervalued and misunderstood, hence the need for 
such a large portion of this chapter to be devoted to a rehabilitation of boredom. None-
theless, as little as we might understand and consciously value boredom, boredom 
plays a large role in our lives, and the provision of affordances for valuable forms of 
boredom has a significant impact on the user experience, and on the value that users 
obtain through the platform. This is not diminished by the user’s unawareness of the 
importance of boredom; boredom is still something we engage in, and seek to engage 
in well.
As we look to understand Facebook’s success, we should not ignore boredom. And 
as we look to what alternatives may effectively replace the social and individual func-
tions of Facebook, we certainly cannot ignore Facebook’s role as a platform for both 
friendertainment and active boredom of a praiseworthy sort.
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